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ABSTRACT   The Lisbon treaty aimed to give more coherence, visibility to the EU and 
strengthen its Single Voice. For that reason, Lisbon replaced the old system of six-month 
rotating presidencies with permanent ones in some of the Council's organs, especially in the 
CFSP area. Leaving aside the debate on whether the Single Voice is an effective strategy in 
international negotiations, this contribution investigates if this institutional modification has 
achieved its goal or, on the contrary, has been harmful for the internal cohesiveness of the 
organs in which has been implemented. By comparing the internal dynamics of the PSC and 
the CFSP CWGs chaired by the permanent chairmanship with the informal system used in 
the MEAs still supervised by the rotating presidency, this paper seeks to show which 
consequences the permanent chairmanship has had since Lisbon and whether other solutions 
were possible to fulfil the same aims. 
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It is usually assumed that a more internal cohesive European Union would be more effective 
on the international fora. This link between internal cohesiveness and external influence has been 
present in the analysis and speeches of many politicians and authors who claim that the strength of 
the EU lies on having a “Single Voice”. This assumption was indeed a motivation behind some of 
the modifications brought by the Lisbon Treaty, which tried to increase the competence of the EU 
in a variety of policy areas and international settings (da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014). One 
of its institutional changes was to replace the system of rotating presidencies in the Council with 
permanent ones, especially in foreign policy. From then on the Foreign Affairs Council has been 
permanently chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and the Political Security Committee as well as some of the CFSP working groups also 
received a permanent chair: an European External Action Service official appointed by the HR. The 
intention behind was to implement a more continuous, coherent and effective European Foreign 
Policy while encouraging member states to take more ownership in this area (Maurer and Wright 
2019). In short, Lisbon aimed to increase the internal cohesiveness in these organs and to facilitate 
the creation of a strong single message. 
 
More than a decade after the reforms introduced by Lisbon, this paper investigates what 
consequences has had the permanent presidency in the EU Single Voice. Has the permanent 
presidency ensured the continuity on the agenda and internal cohesiveness of its organs? Or has 
produced some countereffects damaging the formation of a single message? To answer these 
questions, this contribution is divided in three sections. The first one will consist of the definition of 
EU Single Voice, the enumeration of the main changes brought by Lisbon and the principle critics 
of the rotating Presidency. The second part will be the analysis of which advantages and drawbacks 
has the permanent presidency in the PSC and the CFSP CWGs and how the internal dynamic has 
changed since its introduction.1  
 
1  The basis for this section draws from a series of interviews conducted in 2006, 2011, 2018 and 2019 with PSC ambassadors, 
officials within Permanent Representations, national delegates of the CFSP WGs and EEAS officials carried out by Ana E. Juncos 
and Karolina Pomorska for their studies “Playing the Brussels Game: strategic socialisation in the CFSP CWGs” and “Invisible and 
unaccountable? National Representatives and Council Officials in EU foreign policy”; Sophie Vanhoonacker, Karolina Pomorska 
and Heidi Maurer for their analysis “The presidency in EU External Relations: who is at the helm?”; Maurer and Nicholas Wright 
for the paper “Still governing in the shadows? The role of the PSC in the post-Lisbon EU foreign policy architecture”; and Michel 
Anderlini for his study “A humble servant or an agenda-setter? The role(s) of the EEAS as chair of CWGs on EU’s Common and 




Then, it is going to study the informal system used in the Multilateral Environment Agreements: the 
“lead negotiator”, in which the rotating president is still present. The purpose of this comparison is 
to discover the effect of the two models of presidency on the internal cohesiveness of the organs and 
which one ensures better the continuity on the agenda and consensus. Lastly, the final section offers 
the conclusions summarizing our findings and its limitations.  
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1. What does it mean to have a “Single Voice”?  
When the former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Federica Mogherini, in “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security 
Policy” of 2016 establishes that “a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and 
acts together”, she is referring, among other issues, to the EU Single Voice (Mogherini 2016).  
Moreover, when in the introductory speech of the convention on the Future of Europe of 2002, the 
former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing noted that “the world would feel better if it could 
count on Europe, a Europe which spoke with a single voice to affirm respect for its alliances, but 
also to proclaim, whenever necessary, a message of tolerance and moderation, of openness towards 
difference, and of respect for human rights” he is expressing a common belief in the EU: in order to 
be effective in the external world a single voice is needed (Giscard 2002). But what does “single 
voice” mean? 
In order to address the theoretical part of the EU “Single Voice”, the suggestion of former Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy to make a distinction between “single voice” referring to one message 
and “single mouth” referring to the messenger is a good starting point (Lamy 2002). That is to say, 
a single voice can refer to the unity or coherence of the conveyed by the EU on the one hand or to 
the question whether there is a single negotiator speaking for the EU on the other hand (Keukeleire 
and Delreux 2014). However, following this duality, the best definition might be the one given by 
Macaj and Nicolaïdis which joins this two faces and establishes that “one voice is the expression of 
a common position among EU member states through a single representative or negotiator, that can 





As shown above, the statement of the main literature about the existence of a “single voice mantra” 
is certain. It is generally thought that more unity leads to a much more influential EU in the global 
arena. Although for a long time scholars had also widely assumed that a single voice was a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the EU to be an effective actor in world politics, since 2010 they have 
started to question this direct positive correlation between the degree of internal cohesiveness and 
external effectiveness in global governance (da Conceição-Heldt 2014).  
Some authors have illustrated that in contrast to this conventional thought this single voice is not 
enough or counterproductive. Esther Barbé argued that searching a single voice can result in 
inefficiency and lack of flexibility and it is useless when there is an unfavourable international power 
structure and can even be counterproductive when actors show a “EU normative rejection” because 
of, for example, its colonial history (Barbé 2012). Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt found that the 
effectiveness of the EU was not influenced only by the internal cohesiveness but for the bargaining 
power symmetry or asymmetry of all the actors, so even though there is a high internal cohesiveness 
if there is a bargaining power symmetry it can entail high ineffectiveness, like in the Doha round (da 
Conceição-Heldt 2014). From another perspective, Macaj and Nicolaïdis have studied when EU 
benefits from strategic disunity based on the idea that the EU’s reputation and external credibility 
thrive also on diversity (Macaj and Nicolaïdis 2014).  
These critics of the “one voice mantra” focuses on its outputs taking into account the aim and 
motivations of the EU translated into changes in the Treaties, but hardly they consider if these ones 
actually reinforced this Single Voice. In this brief study the aim is to follow and contribute, as far as 
possible, in the recent debate that has been raised: has the institutional changes provided in Lisbon 
result in a stronger Single Voice? Has the establishment of a permanent president meant an 
improvement for the internal cohesiveness? Or has it changed negatively the internal working 
dynamic of some organs, basis of its unity and internal effectiveness? 
2.2. The Lisbon treaty: changes and modifications 
On 1 December 2009 the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. Trying to overcome the failure of the 
European Constitution, Lisbon uses the traditional method and reforms the already existing 
Constitutive Treaties (Cendón 2009). Even so, the changes brought by this treaty does not differ 
much in content from the ones that were thought in the Constitution. Mainly, the modifications 
abandoned were the ones related to symbols such as some denominations like “Constitution” or 





In general terms, the main implications for the analysis are the following: 
• The structure of "pillars" was abolished and a rigid delimitation of competences between 
the Union and member states was made. However, these pillars still serve as differentiation 
between practices. For example, the CFSP remain separate from the others and retains its 
intergovernmental nature (Wouters et al. 2012)  
• The Union acquired legal personality (art. 47 TEU) which means that it can sign treaties 
since then.  
• The figure of the President of the European Council was introduced and established as a 
permanent position, elected for a renewable period of two and a half years. This aims to give 
greater international visibility and continuity to the Presidency of the EU (art. 15) (Ibid).  
• The High Representative of the European Union For Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy became double-hatted as a Vice President of the European Commissions and is 
supported by the new European External Action Service, which consists of personnel from 
the Council General Secretariat, the Commission and seconded staff from national 
diplomatic services.   
Thus, the HP/VP is at the forefront of the CFSP of the Union and, in such condition, presides 
over the Council of Foreign Affairs and, at the same time, is one of the Vice-Presidents of 
the Commission, responsible in the field of external relations (art. 18 TEU). Again, this 
responds to the intention of giving greater visibility and coherence to the EU's external 
action. 
• Finally, Lisbon and the Council Decision L 322/28 of 1 December 2009 replaced the old 
system of six-month rotating presidencies with permanent presidents in some organs of the 
Council, especially those in CFPS and external relation.  
As we mentioned above, the study is going to focus on this last institutional modification due to its 
implication in the role and the dynamics of the organs in question. Therefore, it is going to examine 
which critics the rotating presidency had and what was expected of its change to a permanent one. 






2.3. The rotating presidency: critics and main shortcomings 
The Council of the EU is a single legal entity, but it meets in 10 different configurations, 
depending on the subject being discussed. These later at the same time, are supported by the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the European 
Union (Coreper I and II) and more than 150 highly specialised working parties known as the 
“Council preparatory bodies” which carry out the technical debates (Council EU, 2019).   
Until Lisbon, the EU was characterised by a single Presidency of the Council which was held every 
six months by a different member state. Therefore, the member states were the ones in charge of 
chairing the meetings of the working parties, the ministerial level and the meetings of the heads of 
state and government. Although this system allowed member states to be involved and preside over 
the EU regardless of their size, it was criticized that it lacked continuity and relied on the 
organizational and leadership capacity of the country at the helm (Vanhoonacker et al, 2011). 
Since the beginning of the 70s discussions about reform of the presidency were present. Apart from 
its lack of continuity on the agenda, other complains were constant: the political nature of the chair, 
its chaotic organisation, the insufficient preparation, and the increasing workload. (Vanhoonacker 
and Schout 2003). These critics of continuity on the agenda, leadership and coherence were 
especially visible in CFSP where the six-monthly stop-go process was increasingly seen as 
problematic (Bengtsson et al. 2004). Introducing a long-term chair in the FAC and its preparatory 
bodies, Lisbon tried to overcome these deficiencies. 
Nonetheless, some authors have claimed that it is possible that this change will also have unforeseen 
and undesirable consequences. The legitimacy of the rotating presidency was high because it was 
a symbol of equality among member states. The fact that all of them had to take the presidency 
created a common empathy and comprise since all were aware of the difficulty of being in that 
position. At the same time, failing to reach an agreement was considered a failure, so everyone had 
a predisposition to work together (Maurer and Wright 2019). 
The question is whether the introduction of a permanent presidency has ensured the expected 
continuity, coherence, and internal cohesiveness or has caused counterproductive effects. In the 
following section, it is going to be discussed how the role of the Presidency and internal work 
dynamics have mutated in the PSC and some CFSP WGs. Then, the study will focus on the EU 
International Environmental policy and the “lead negotiator” system to compare the previous work 






3.1. The Political and Security Committee and CFSP working groups 
In first place, when comparing the CFSP to other EU areas it is necessary to remember that 
the competence of the CFSP is not exclusive, shared or supporting. It is seen as a special type of 
competence and has specific rules and procedures (art. 24.1 TFEU). For example, the policy-
framing, decision-making and implementation depends more on the European Council, the Council 
and the HR, opposed to the Commission and European Parliament. Besides, the decisions are by 
default to be adopted unanimously (Biondi et al. 2012).  
Secondly, the PSC is one of the preparatory bodies of the FAC and one of the main EU bodies 
contributing to the formulation and implementation of European foreign policy (Juncos & Reynolds, 
2007). It is explained in article 38 TEU and it is responsible for the CFSP and the EU CSDP. 
Specifically: follows the international situation; recommends strategic approaches and policy 
options to the Council; provides guidance to the Military Committee, the Political-Military Group 
and the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management and exercises political control and 
strategic direction of crisis management operations.  
The PSC became permanent in January 2001 and it was designed to correct the lack of continuity 
and permanency in the personnel of the key organisms and the shifting location of meetings, which 
was the capital of the six-monthly presidency (Howorth 2010). It is made up of the Brussels-based 
ambassadors of the member states and, since Lisbon, is chaired by representatives of the European 
External Action Service. It prepares the Foreign Affairs Council’s monthly deliberations and PSC 
ambassadors meet twice a week and more frequently if necessary.  
Below the PSC there are the Council Working Groups. The CWGs are composed by national 
representatives based in the Brussels Permanent Representations and their role is to discuss and draft 
CFSP documents such as Joint Actions, Council Conclusions and Action Plans (Juncos and 
Pomorska, 2007). As well as the PSC, some CWGs are now chaired by EEAS officials.2  
 
2 The following CFSP CWGs are chaired by EEAS officials: The CivCOM, the CONUN, the COSCE, the 
COHOM, the COTRA, the COEST, the COWEB, the MOG, the MAMA, the COAFR, the COASI, the 





In order to see if Lisbon has put an end to the weaknesses of the rotating Presidency without 
damaging the internal cohesiveness of the organs explained, we have compiled and organized those 
studies on the subject based on interviews with PSC ambassadors and Working Group diplomats 
and EEAS officials. These papers had a different aim such as show which role has now the PSC 
(Maurer & Wright 2019), how was the role of EEAS as chair of the WGs (Anderlini 2019), if the 
permanent presidency of the council is now ensuring the continuity and coherence (Vanhoonacker 
et al. 2011) or track the impact of socialisation processes on Council officials and national 
representatives (Juncos & Pomorska 2006; 2011). Still, the opinions and conclusions expressed in 
them are applicable in our research.  
 
3.1.1. Advantages of the permanent Presidency 
The most repeated improvement by the interviewees is precisely the desired continuity on the 
agenda. One EEAS official interviewed by Maurer and Wright on their study “Still Governing in the 
Shadows? The Role of the PSC in the Post-Lisbon EU Foreign Policy Architecture” explained that now 
they follow a broader agenda and that they can come regularly back to certain issues that probably 
with the rotating presidency could fade away. In the same way, the Czech Permanent Representation 
expressed that it also facilitates a longer-term perspective (Maurer and Wright 2019, 18). 
To this continuity are added the benefits of permanence which ensures that the EEAS knows its 
colleagues, what they want, their stance and understands the sensitives of states around certain 
issues. In the same previous study, the Slovakian Permanent Representation highlighted that 
compared to some states which do not have the knowledge or interest in everything, the EEAS is 
able to look at everything (Ibid, 20). Hence, one of the most valued advantages is that the EEAS has 
greater resources and the capacity to provide coverage of global issues. 
Simultaneously, is expected from the EEAS to be a completely “honest broker” which only works 
in the best interests of all EU member states. In the interviews carried out by Anderlini in his 
contribution “A Humble servant or an agenda-setter?” some EEAS officials underlined the 
importance of this role and added that they always try to do the identification of points of consensus 




So, they believe not only that the fairness and transparency has been reinforced but also that member 
states have greater possibilities to influence decision in CFSP since they simply have one person to 
talk to. Nevertheless, national delegates expressed that they did not experienced that their 
possibilities to influence decision-making had decreased or increased (Anderlini 2019, 45). 
Moreover, as it is going to discuss in the next section, other national delegates did not see the EEAS 
as neutral because it has its own specific position. 
Apart from that, the EEAS taking over the role of the rotating Presidency in international 
organizations enhances EU coherence and visibility in international fora. This replacement is 
significant when representing the EU in negotiations and outreach meetings with non-EU countries, 
regional groups or organizations and delivering the statements and explanation of vote on behalf of 
the EU at formal meeting of international organizations (Wouters et al. 2012). The frequent change 
in office in CFSP proved problematic, so the nomination of a long-term chairs creates new 
opportunities (Vanhoonacker et al. 2011).  
Finally, the fact that the PSC and some WGs are chaired by a permanent EEAS official is also 
beneficial for the continuity of negotiations in the FAC, chaired by the HR/VP. On one hand, the 
EEAS provides the HR/VP with continuous information on the issues discussed previously in the 
PSC and the WGs. On the other hand, when is necessary to react at very short notice and collectively 
with the HR/VP, the Danish Permanent Representation expressed that the EEAS chair can be 
important in shaping a unified EU position in a complex and fast-moving environment (Maurer & 
Wright 2019). As noted by Wouters, Bijlmakers and Meuwissen, the EEAS “could help the HR in 
generating a consensus within the Council by providing her [him] with insights into the real starting 
points of Member States and ensuring that […] the maximum possible degree of consensus can be 
extracted from it” (Wouters et al. 2012, 23). 
 
3.1.2. Drawbacks of the permanent Presidency 
 As for the PSC, these changes to the PSC’s institutional environment have not been 
unproblematic due to an emerging tension between it and EEAS. One Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office from London mentioned that the EEAS tries to keep decisions away from PSC and it only 





Secondly, in PSC as well as in WGs the representatives and national delegates do not agree totally 
with the fact that the EEAS is an absolute “honest broker”. The already mentioned Office from 
London made the point that if a consensus decision adopted in the PSC goes against the preferences 
of the EEAS and the HR/VP can result in EEAS officials trying to reverse the positions taken by the 
member state ambassadors. While some officials did not see as a surprise the fact that the EEAS has 
developed its own agenda, some member states complain about it, especially when the EEAS tries 
to impose it (Ibid). Moreover, national diplomats have been complaining about the late delivery of 
agenda and documents for debates since the introduction of the EEAS chair. This has caused a lack 
of transparency and confidence (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2012; Anderlini 2019). 
At the same time, one EEAS official commented that the level of ambition has decreased 
comparing it to the pre-Lisbon period and remarked that when member states held the chairmanship 
they wanted the presidency to be as successful as possible (Anderlini 2019, 51). Before 2009, the 
code of conduct identified in the WGs was the consensus building practice and even though the 
member states had veto power they did not usually make use of it. There was a general practice to 
keep everyone on board and a constant pressure to get an agreement. According to practitioners and 
academics in 2006 the effectiveness of the CWGs was usually high: the 90% to 95% of the issues 
in the agenda were agreed (Juncos and Pomorska 2006). In this post-Lisbon period, it does not have 
much importance when exactly the objectives are achieved and the previous empathy seems to have 
been lost. One national delegate observed that in the rotating presidency was a strength of self-
regulation: the member states knew that if they want to be listened by the chair they should also be 
a good chair for the other members when was their turn (Anderlini 2019, 51). However, now the EU 
member states can just point the finger at the permanent chair and no longer feel as a failure whether 
the objectives are not reached (Maurer & Wright 2019). 
All combined might have caused a disaffection of the member states. There is now a more passive 
and reactive attitude among national delegates and member states do not provide topics for the 
agenda as often as they used to. One member state delegate, who was at the same time active in a 
non-CFSP working group which the presidency is still held by states, declared that he had “the 
impression that the EU member states feel more involved in the agenda in WGs where EU member 
states still hold the presidency” (Anderlini 2019, 41). In the end, the most important advantage of 
having a rotating presidency was from a pedagogic and socialising nature (Vanhoonacker & Schout, 




Studying these dynamics is important since a large part of the workload of CFSP is already agreed 
at the level of WGs and preparatory bodies (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006). If these WGs stop 
reaching consensus because its internal cohesiveness has been damaged, the other higher bodies will 
be affected as well. In fact, one EEAS official mentioned in the interview with Anderlini that this 
permanent chairmanship has led to a situation with less intergovernmentalism but also with less 
Council conclusions (Anderlini 2019, 52).  
All in all, it is doubtful that more coherence and continuity have been ensured in CFSP. 
While there are advantages such as greater resources, institutional memory and more abilities to 
think strategically, if the member states feel powerless, partly excluded from agenda-setting tasks 
and less bound by CFSP there is a risk that the EEAS chairmanship causes fragmentation and less 
internal cohesiveness. Therefore, the single voice might have been negatively affected by this 
institutional change.  
 
3.2. International environmental negotiations and MEAs  
First, it is necessary to consider that the environment competences are shared 
competences. This differs from the CFSP in the decision-making process and which institutions are 
involved. The art. 192.1 TFEU makes the ordinary legislative procedure predominate when adopting 
internal EU environmental legislation. This implies that the qualified majority rule applies as a 
method of adopting the final decision by the Council. However, when deciding the external 
dimension of the EU, it is decided by consensus in the Council and the member states regain their 
veto power (Sánchez 2014). Then, the Council is responsible for preparing EU positions for 
environmental international conferences and negotiations. Nonetheless, at international level the 
main policy-making forum is the Working Party on International Environmental Issues (WPIEI). It 
is composed of member state and Commission officials, chaired by the rotating presidency, and 
prepares the EU overall position that is subsequently adopted by the ministers (Delreux 2018).  
On the other hand, the TFEU emphasizes the shared nature of external environment 
competences of the Union. This means that the MEAs are mixed agreements so both EU and member 
states become a party to it. Moreover, it is not clear in the treaties how the EU has to negotiate these 
mixed agreements and in the logic of the shared competences the system of “dual representation” is 





Therefore, in MEA negotiations the most used formula is “single voice through multiple mouths”. 
It is important to highlight that negotiating via the presidency is a political choice. Whereas the 
member states could negotiate individually, they usually opt to pool their voices and to delegate 
their negotiation authority to a common negotiator to create bargaining power (Delreux, 2010; 
2014). 
 This lack of clarity has caused tensions between the Commission and the Council. The Commission 
tried to be the sole negotiator in areas of shared competences expressing that Lisbon aimed to 
increase the coherence of the EU’s external representation and that the failure in the Copenhagen 
climate conference in 2009 had proven that the old system did not work (Delreux 2010). 
Commission President Barroso outlined that “Copenhagen showed that, while others did not match 
our ambition, we did not help ourselves by not speaking with one voice” (Barroso, 2010). He made 
an association between ineffectiveness with internal incohesiveness. However, would Copenhagen 
have been successful if there had been a sole negotiator? Some authors have related this failure to 
the internal disunity of the Union because of the inter-institutional struggles and some member states 
openly questioning the targets set by the Commission. Others argued that the EU’s strategy was too 
normative and politically naïve disregarding the dynamic of the negotiation context (Bäckstrand 
2013; Harvey 2011). These studies, therefore, do not conclude that the fault was due to not having 
a single negotiator. In fact, the old system was maintained and after Copenhagen other negotiations 
were successful for the EU. 
The officials participating in the WPIEI emphasised that pragmatic and flexible negotiation 
arrangements is what the EU needed if it wanted to negotiate effectively. So, it was preferred a 
Presidency-led negotiation arrangement to enable the Member states and the Commission to be 
informally involved than what the superiors of the Commission were claiming (Delreux 2012). In 
the end, due to the vagueness of the treaty provisions and distribution of competences and the 
interinstitutional tensions, the EU negotiation arrangement in MEAs is often ad hoc depending on 
pragmatic considerations. The most common system used is the lead country/lead negotiator and 






3.2.1. Lead country/negotiator  
As described by Tom Delreux, the lead country/negotiator is “an informal system that takes 
place under the formal authority of the Presidency, whereby the negotiation task is informally 
divided among a couple of negotiators, each negotiating on behalf of the EU for a longer period than 
the six-monthly rotating Presidency and for a particular set of issues” (Delreux 2012; 2014).  
Then, the EU’s negotiation set-up for the MEAs usually consists of three institutional bodies: the 
WPIEI explained above, expert groups and the EU Team. In general, the function of the WPIEI is 
to determine the political mandate and position during and between the sessions. The expert groups 
prepare technical input of EU positions for the WPIEI between the sessions. And, finally, the EU 
team conducts the negotiations during the sessions on behalf of the EU, except when they shift to 
ministerial level (Delreux, 2018). Whereas the expert groups are composed of experts from the 
member states and the Commission, the EU team is composed of the lead negotiators and of number 
of experts from various member states and the Commission. For example, in the negotiation on the 
Paris Agreement on climate change in 2016, the lead negotiators were from Germany, the UK and 
the Commission. 
This informal system has not only allowed the EU to overcome the imprecise Treaty 
provisions but also to agree on the negotiation positions in advance of international negotiations 
(Ibid). Besides, the Presidency shares the burden of the negotiation task since these are often too 
complex and dense. So, the expertise and experiences of many actors can be optimally used, the 
member states are fully involved in the negotiations and, finally, because the lead negotiators 
usually works for a couple of years, the continuity is guaranteed without eliminating the rotating 
presidency (Delreux and Van den Brande, 2013).  
Moreover, despite there are heterogeneous preferences among the member states the decision-
making process can succeed in aggregating them into an EU common position. That is one of the 
reasons of being externally represented by different mouths in most of the global MEA negotiations 
is effective: what matters is they all send a similar message (Delreux, 2014). 
However, it is true that since the technical preparation of the EU has been shifted to expert groups 
and the negotiations are carried out by the EU Team, the rotating Presidency has now a more 
managerial function and is the external representation with the Commission only when the 





But, despite its functions have been reduced, this well-established internal decision-making process 
has maintained the main benefits of the rotating presidency (i.e. feeling of reciprocity between 
member states) while removing its drawbacks (i.e. lack of continuity on the agenda).    
Before concluding the analysis, it must be borne in mind that two different areas were 
compared and in the second one consensus is usually more likely because there is already internal 
legislation in many environmental subdomains. Likewise, although theoretically all member states 
must agree upon on an EU position, many of them remain inactive and indifferent on many issues. 
So, sometimes just a relatively small number of member states are the ones who take the lead 
(Delreux 2014). 
Nonetheless, what this comparison might have taught is that to reinforce continuity on the agenda, 
eliminating the rotating presidency was not completely necessary. While the permanent presidency 
has not totally fulfilled its aims in the CFSP preparatory bodies, it has brought up new problems. 
Some authors already pointed out that various documents which made suggestions for improvement, 
such as Tindemans Report (1976), Three Wise Men (1979) and Trumpf Piris (1999) never 
questioned the principle of rotation (Vanhoonacker et al. 2011).3 Besides, Vanhoonacker and 
Schout expressed that the debates and critics of the rotating presidency were taking place without 
studying in depth its strengths and weaknesses and that the proposals “seem to be more based on 








3 Tindermans proposed to lengthen the period to one year and to have the possibility to entrust certain specific tasks to 
a single country no matter the one in the presidency and The three Wise Men recommend to reinforce the chair by 






The aim of this contribution was to address if the institutional modification of the rotating 
presidency in a permanent one in some organs of the Council has reinforced the EU Single Voice. 
Understanding single voice as internal cohesiveness, the following conclusions have been drawn.  
First, due to most of the declarations provided by those who are part of the PSC and the CFSP WGs, 
it is questioned whether the permanent presidency has fulfilled its mission. While it is true that the 
EEAS as chairmanship has the capacity and the proper characteristics to achieve it (better resources, 
more information and a global vision), it needs to solve the disaffection, passivity and suspicion that 
it seems to have created in the member states. To strengthen internal cohesiveness, facilitate reaching 
Council conclusions and create a single strong message, it is not enough to deal with continuity on 
the agenda: it also requires states to be active and committed. However, these conclusions are based 
on interviews and opinions, so other methods like process tracing could be considered to obtain 
more solid results. 
Second, the informal system “lead negotiator” used in MEAs shows that to improve the lack of 
continuity was not completely necessary to remove the rotating presidency. While it is a system that 
requires time, effort and preparation it is also uncontested because of its benefits and efficiency. Not 
only guarantees continuity and an optimal use of the actors’ expertise of all, but also enables the 
member states to be fully involved. Thus, although there are different interests among the member 
states, thanks to that internal dynamic it is possible to reach a common position among them. 
Nevertheless, the fact that internal legislation already exists in this area makes it is easier for the 
states to agree on environmental issues. In any case, this study does not intend to propose that the 
informal system used in MEAs has to be also used in the CFSP area. The main point of the 
comparison was to discover if other solutions could have been better for the same problems and 
objectives. 
In brief, whereas the areas compared are dissimilar and that other indicators could be considered to 
measure the impact of the permanent presidency, it can be concluded that the institutional change 
studied has not strengthened the EU Single Voice. For the moment, the permanent presidency has 
not led to a more cohesive and efficient internal dynamic and, in fact, it seems to have created more 
fragmentation and less agreements. It remains to be seen how the situation unfolds and whether the 
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